A new ALEXANDER paper on strategic behavior in TSO-DSO coordinated flexibility markets has been published

A new scientific paper describing the work done in ALEXANDER has been published!

In this publication in Elsevier Sustainable Energy, Grids and Networks Luciana Marques and Anibal Sanjab  investigate the way in which the design of a TSO-DSO coordinated flexibility market can enable strategic behavior by flexibility service providers (FSPs). Multiple flexibility market models are considered for the procurement of flexibility services by transmission and distribution system operators, namely: a common (joint) market, a fragmented market, and a sequential multi-level market. Considering these market models, three non-cooperative games are introduced to investigate the strategic bidding and interaction between FSPs therein. Detailed conclusions are then drawn on the existence and uniqueness of Nash Equilibria (NEs) in the developed games, including derivations of closed-form expressions of the resulting NEs and corresponding price-of-anarchy, capturing the FSPs’ strategic bidding impact on the markets’ efficiency. 

Interested to read the full paper, please check on https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352467724002054