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Operating envelope approach for grid-safe participation of distributed flexibility in balancing markets

Antwerner

Energy

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Wicak Ananduta, L. Marques, A. Kaushal, A. Sanjab, T. Cuypers, and J. Vanschoenwinkel

UHASSEL[®]

Outline

1 Distributed flexibility in balancing markets

2 Integrating operating envelopes

3 Analysis of the approach



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Flexibility requirements



Daily flexibility requirements in Europe [Koolen, et, al., '23]



Distributed flexibility



Renewable energy production [IEA '24]



EV sale projection [IEA '24]



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Responsibility, data confidentiality, communication intensive



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(BM)

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Unsafe activation

Cleared offers located in DNs causing network problems



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Allowable dynamic limits without causing network issues



[Liu, et. al., PEM'21]

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: { $p_n | 0 \le p_n \le \varepsilon_n$ }



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 - OPF-based: [Petrou, et. al., TSG'21], [Liu, et. al., TSG'22], [Liu, et. al., 2023], [Feng, et. al., TSG'24],
 - Scenario/sampling based: [Riaz & Mancarella, '19], [Wang, et. al., AE'20], [Lankeshwara, et. al., TPS'24]



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Research gaps

- How OEs impact balancing market outcomes
- Fundamental analysis



OE-based balancing market

• Redefined market clearing problem:

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- No DNConst needed!
- OEs as *simple* prequalification measure
- Network feasibility study in Belgium: static OE
- Compatible with existing regulation [Marques, et. al., Alexander D3.2, 2024]



Optimization-based operating envelope calculation

- Optimize OE_n for all DN resources
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One-step method [Petrou, et. al., TSG'21]

- Compute OE_n for all resources
- Quadratic objective function:

$$\min\sum_{n\in \text{ResourcesDN}_m} w_n (\varepsilon_n - p_n^{\max})^2$$



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Two-step method [Liu, et. al., TSG'22]

- Compute OE_n for downward and upward resources separately
- Linear objective function:

$$\max \sum_{n \in \mathsf{ResourcesDN}_{\mathsf{m}}} w_n \cdot \varepsilon_n$$



Optimization-based operating envelope calculation (+)

- Different weight *w_n* types:
 - Equal,

 $w_n = 1$, for all resources

• Price-based:

 $w_n \propto egin{cases} || \operatorname{price}_n ||, & ext{for all downward resources} \\ 1/| \operatorname{price}_n ||, & ext{for all upward resources} \end{cases}$

• Quantity-based:

 $w_n = p_n^{\max}$, for all resources



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Assessing performance of integrating OEs into balancing market:

- Grid safety of cleared offers
 - Satisfaction of voltage and line flow limits (DNConst)
 - DNConst uses linearized branch flow model
- Market efficiency
 - Total flexibility procurement cost
 - Benchmarked with idealized formulation
- Volume of unqualified DN offers



Numerical tests (+) [Kaushal, et. al., ISGT'24]

- \sim 300 cases (downward scenario) where (BM *no-DN*) is not grid safe
 - IEEE 14-bus TN coupled with Matpower 69-bus and 141-bus DNs
 - Monte Carlo simulations: randomly generated loads, generation, flexibility offers



- 2-step OE always provides grid-safe (but possibly suboptimal) outcomes
- 1-step OE does not always provide grid-safe outcomes
- Price-based weight is best in market efficiency



Numerical tests (++) [Kaushal, et. al., ISGT'24]



• 2-step OE provides more restricted limits than 1-step OE



Theoretical results

- DNConst is linearized branch flow model [Sanjab, et. al., '21]
- Distribution networks are radial
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(Theorem) Grid safety guarantee

If OE_n calculated with **2-step method**, outcomes of (BM-OE), $(p_n^*)_{n \in \text{Resources}}$ are grid safe, i.e.,

$$\exists arphi^{\mathsf{DN}_m} \mid (p_n^*)_{n \in \mathsf{Resources}\mathsf{DN}_m} \in \mathsf{DNConst}(arphi^{\mathsf{DN}_m}), \quad \forall m \in \mathsf{DNs}$$
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(Proposition) Suboptimality

Outcomes are suboptimal and inefficiency of (BM-OE) can be upper-bounded by

$$\sum_{n=1}^{n} \sum_{n=1}^{n} \operatorname{price}_{n}(p_{n}^{*}-\hat{p}_{n})$$

 $m \in DNs \ n \in Resources DN_m$

where $(\hat{p}_n)_{n \in \text{Resources}}$ are outcomes of (BM).



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- OE calculation method impacts performance
- 2-step OE calculation method with price-based weight is the best tested option



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- Further research directions:
 - Understanding (theoretical) limitations when other (more realistic) power flow models are considered
 - Uncertainties in the OE calculation: what kind of guarantees can we have?



Conclusion

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- OE calculation method impacts performance
- 2-step OE calculation method with price-based weight is the best tested option
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Publications:

- "Development of a novel, grid safe concept for flexibility provision from the LV grid," Alexander D3.2.
- "Embedding operating envelopes in the market design to unlock the flexibility potential of distribution grids," CIRED Vienna Workshop, 2024.
- "Operating envelopes for the grid-constrained use of distributed flexibility in balancing markets," ISGT Europe Conference, 2024. Best paper award!
- "Grid-safe flexibility market design based on the operating envelope approach," in preparation for journal submission.





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https://alexander-project.vito.be/en alexander@energyville.be